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In his Note, The Proof Is in the Policy: The Bush Administration, Non-
point Source Pollution, and EPA 's Final TMDL Rule, Bryant McCulley ob-
serves that the regulation of nonpoint source (NPS) pollution involves conten-
tious issues of environmental federalism. ' I could not agree more. However,
I would like to take this opportunity to push this discussion in a new direction.
NPS regulation should transcend domestic federalism concerns and recognize
the transnational nature of environmental harm. This is particularly the case
given ecosystem interconnection and the cross-border sources of water pollu-
tion. Unless these tansnational sources of pollution are taken into account,
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation of NPS may fall short of
its goals.
McCulley concludes that, for statutory reasons, the actual regulation of
NPS must remain the prerogative of the states.2 I read this conclusion as more
* Visiting Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law, Assistant Pro-
fessor, Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
1. See R. Bryant McCulley, The ProofIs in the Policy: The Bush Administration, Non-
point Source Pollution, and EPA 'sFinal TMDL Rule, 59 WAsh & LE L. REV. 237 (2002).
2. See id. at 247 (stating that under § 303 of Clean Water Act, EPA does not have statu-
tory power to directly regulate NPS pollution).
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than just a matter of statutory imperative, but also as a normative endorsement
on McCulley's part of the principle of subsidiarity. This endorsement ought
to prompt reflection among international lawyers. In a world of transnational
environmental harm, is there cause for concern about positing states and sub-
national units as the most appropriate locus for environmental governance?
L The Clean Water Act and the TMDL Litigation
The traditional focus of the Clean Water Act (CWA) has been to encour-
age states to regulate water pollution through the use of technology-based
standards and discharge permits under § 402 of the Act.' This traditional
focus has been quite successful in addressing point sources of water pollution.
NPS pollution, on the other hand, continues to increase. NPS pollution occurs
when water runs over land or through the ground, picks up pollutants, and
deposits them in surface waters or groundwater. Major sources of NPS pollu-
tion include cattle farms, agriculture, mines, and silviculture. NPS pollution
is responsible for a large part of the impairment of the nation's streams and
rivers, which, in turn, is only the first step in a broader array of environmental
harms. Water contamination can accumulate within the food chain and affect
biodiversity and life generally.
So, how can NPS pollution be regulated? McCulley posits that the
CWA's long-dormant Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL)4 program can offer
assistance. A TMDL is an estimate of the maximum amount of a pollutant that
a water body can assimilate and still meet applicable water quality standards.'
If states establish TMDLs and strive to ensure that water bodies adhere to those
TMDLs, then overall water quality will improve. Using the TMDL approach
would diversify the regulatory focus to include water quality-based standards,
as opposed to a singular focus on technology-based standards.
Administrative action involving TMDLs and NPS pollution has attracted
lawsuits in both the Ninth and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals.6 McCulley's Note focuses on litigation in the D.C. Circuit where, in
American Farm Bureau Federation,7 litigants challenged the EPA's Final
TMDL Rule (Final Rule).' These litigants allege that the EPA exceeded its
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-(b) (1994).
4. Id. § 1313(d).
5. See 40 C.F.R. §130.7(cXl) (2001) (providing that TMDLs must be set so that applica-
ble water quality standards are attained and maintained).
6. Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. EPA, No. 00-1320 (D.C. Cir. filed July 18, 2000);
Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Cal. 2000), appeal docketed, No. 00-16026
(9th Cir. May 24,2000).
7. No. 00-1320 (D.C. Cir. filed July 18,2000).
8. Final TMDL Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586 (July 13, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 9, 122-4, 130).
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authority in promulgating a Final Rule for TMDLs that covered rivers affected
solely by NPS pollution. Those defending the Final Rule include: (1) environ-
mentalists, (2) point source industries, such as the sewage disposal industry,
and (3) other entities seeking inexpensive pollution control now that the addi-
tional marginal costs for point source reductions have steadily risen. Critics
of the Final Rule find fault with the requirement that states develop TMDLs
for waterbodies solely impaired by NPS; they also take exception to the re-
quirement that implementation plans, attainment schedules, and reasonable
assurances that the TMDLs will achieve water quality standards be included
in the Final Rule. McCulley posits that the case ultimately may be decided
through use of the well-known Chevron test, in which the court is to consider
whether Congress has spoken directly in the statute to the precise question at
issue, and, if it has not, then to determine whether the agency's position is
based on a reasonable construction of the statute.9 In the American Farm Bur-
eau Federation case attacking the Final Rule, McCulley suggests it is possible
that the second tier of the Chevron test will support the EPA's position that
it possesses the statutory authority under the CWA to include waters impaired
solely by NPS pollution in the TMDL program.10
I. The Need to Look Transnationally
There is an important transnational aspect to NPS pollution that has, thus
far, been overlooked in the debate involving EPA's Final TMDL Rule. In
North America, activity within the maquiladora is particularly problematic."
The maquiladora is a sixty-mile wide stretch of the 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico
border where a commercial free trade zone was created in 1965. The pluralized
term maquiladoras often refers to factories that are jointly owned by foreign
(mostly U.S.) and Mexican companies, but operate on the Mexican side ofthe
border. Approximately 2,500 maquiladoras have opened since 1965. The
maquiladoras import raw materials or components into Mexico tariff-free
(usually from their U.S. parent corporations), manufacture these materials in
Mexico (thereby benefitting from lower labor costs and other inputs), and then
ship the finished products back into the U.S. for sale to consumers.
One of the major environmental problems in the maquiladora is trans-
boundary water pollution from point sources (factories) and NPSs (principally
cattle ranching farms, but also agriculture). Transboundary watercourses, the
9. See McCulley, supra note 1, at 280-82 (citing Chevron v. Natural Res. Def Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
10. See id. at 281 (positing that appellate court will find that EPA's construction of statute
is reasonable under step two of Chevron framework.).
11. See Mexican Free-trade Zone a Major Source of Water Pollution, U.S. Water News
Online, available at httpJ/www.uswatemews.com/archivea/arcglobal/6mexfre.html (last visited
Feb. 15, 2002) (describing water pollution issues in maquiladoras).
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underground water table, and natural aquifers have carried this NPS pollution
northward. As a result, some counties in Texas - often referred to as the
colonias - suffer serious pollution and health problems. This is not to under-
state the significant environmental harms befalling many Mexican residents
in the maquiladora. Rather, it is to point out the short-sightedness of those
who believe that environmental harms can be externalized only on the Mexi-
can side of the border. Ecologically, this is not possible; morally, of course,
it is downright wrong. k
Who bears the regulatory burden for controlling this cross-border pollu-
tion? Even if Texas adhered to TMDLs, who is to be held accountable for
pollutants coming into Texas from a foreign country? And the challenge is
not just limited to Texas. The New River, which flows through Mexicali,
Mexico and into California's Imperial Valley has been contaminated by over
100 toxic chemicals including PCBs and DDT, and it carries polio, encephali-
tis, and hepatitis. For its part, the Arizona border region has hepatitis infec-
tion rates at twenty times the national average.
Looking northward, agricultural and industrial activities in Canada create
both point source and NPS pollution with spillover effects on U.S. territory.
Cooperative environmental management efforts have addressed these cross-
border effects. One important example of bilateral cooperation involves the
management of water quality in the Great Lakes, which constitute about one-
fifth of the world's freshwater.
In response to the mutual vulnerabilities of transnational environmental
harm, we are seeing the emergence of what I would call North American
environmental supra-nationalism. Domestic environmental protection mecha-
nisms should not be separated from, nor made parallel to, these transnational
arrangements. There is a need for perpendicularity, not parallelism.
IiI. Forms of North American Environmental Supra-Nationalism
A. Treaties andAgreements
Water quality and the regulation of point and NPS pollution is the subject
matter of a number of regional and bilateral treaties.
1. US.-Canada Border
In 1909, Canada and the U.S. created the International Joint Commission
(IJC), an independent bilateral agency, to manage shared water resources such
as the Great Lakes." The IJC is composed of six members (three from each
12. See Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Between the United
States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.- Britain, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548 (1909) (creating
UC).
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country). Among other things, the IJC addresses pollution concerns and settles
disputes regarding common management issues. Water quality became a cen-
tral focus of the UC's activities in 1972, following the adoption of the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement. 3 In this regard, a Water Quality Board that
coordinates pollution policies for the Great Lakes advises the IJC. The envi-
ronmental regulation of the Great Lakes is managed by water quality stan-
dards established through regular surveillance. One concern is the control of
point source pollutant discharges such as phosphorous.
In 1978, the 1972 Agreement was superceded by another agreement that,
together with an important amendnnt enacted in 1987, addresses NPS pollu-
tion. The need to regulate NPS already was emphasized in the 1970s when
studies demonstrated that run-off from agriculture, urban areas, and the atmos-
phere was affecting water quality; accordingly, experts concluded that direct
control ofpoint source pollution simply was not enough to achieve water qual-
ity objectives. In the end, bilateral cooperation advanced the environmental
regime in the Great Lakes much more than uncoordinated unilateral national
policies.
2. US. -Mexico Border
Environmental problems along the U.S.-Mexico border prodded the crea-
tion of the La Paz Agreement in 1983.14 Although the La Paz Agreement can
be faulted for lacking teeth, the point remains that it is important for having
focused public attention on environmental problems along the border. In many
ways, the La Paz Agreement laid the groundwork for a 1993 side-agreement to
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),5 titled the North Amer-
ican Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).'6 The Commission
on Environmental Cooperation (CEC), based in Montr6al, Canada, implements
and supervises the NAAEC. Another side agreement to the NAFTA created the
Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), which certifies
environmental projects relating to wastewater and water pollution.
7 The North
American Development Bank (NADBank) finances projects certified by the
13. 23 U.S.T.S. 301, T.IA.S. No. 7312 (Apr. 15, 1972).
14. Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on
Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, Aug.
14, 1983,80 Stat. 271.
15. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
289.
16. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-
Can.-Mex, 32 I.L.M. 1480.
17. Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environmental Cooperation
Commission and a North American Development Bank, Nov. 16-18, 1993, U.S.-Mex, 32
I.L.M. 1545.
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BECC. Thus far, the NADBank has certified two to three dozen projects,
although it does not remain capitalized to its full potential.
3. Enforcement Mechanisms and Public Participation
The NAAEC provides an interesting addition to typical private-attorney
general mechanisms that complainants may use to secure some level of com-
pliance with environmental statutes. Article 14 of the NAAEC permits public
submissions to the CEC Secretariat alleging that any of the three NAFTA
parties has failed effectively to enforce its domestic environmental laws. Thus
far, most of the submitters have been non-governmental organizations, such
as environmental watchdog groups;" but corporations are also becoming
involved in the process (albeit largely to prevent other corporations from
gaining a comparative advantage by operating in a system of lax environmen-
tal enforcement). If the Secretariat wishes, it can request a response from the
NAFTA party that is the subject of the complaint. However, that party is
under no obligation to respond. But, regardless of whether there is a response,
the Secretariat then may recommend to the Council the preparation of a fac-
tual record under Article 15. The Council, which is composed of the environ-
mental ministers (or their delegates) of the three NAFTA parties, then may (by
a two-thirds vote) instruct the Secretariat to prepare a factual record regarding
the initial submission.' 9 The Council can later make the record publicly
available. Thus far, factual records have been ordered in a number of com-
plaints. Article 14 public submissions have covered diverse matters in each of
the three NAFTA countries, ranging from underground storage tank regula-
tion, building piers, enforcement of domestic freshwater fisheries legislation,
and water pollution, to procedural environmental assessment matters. Too
many adverse factual findings eventually may lead to an allegation of a :"per-
sistent pattern of failure" to "effectively enforce" national environmental law.
Such allegations can constitute a basis for party-to-party consultation under
NAAEC Article 22. If these consultations fail to resolve the matter, then dis-
pute resolution procedures can be initiated under the NAAEC. Although
recourse has not yet been had to these procedures, the NAAEC does provide
for fines, "monetary enforcement assessments," under Article 34, and the pos-
sibility of suspension of some NAFTA benefits in the event the fines are
unpaid under Article 36.
Environmental issues along the U.S.-Mexico border have received greater
interest post-NAFTA than they received pre-NAFTA. This does not necessar-
18. For example, in a recent submission regarding air and water quality that invoked the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements, the submitters included the Sierra Club and Friends of
the Earth.
19. The Council may limit the scope of the factual record.
294
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ily mean that environmental quality has improved since NAFTA. This is a
hotly debated issue and there are many indicia of deteriorating environmental
quality, although that may simply be due to an increased awareness of envi-
ronmental quality issues in the first place. However, following the implemen-
tation of NAFTA, the EPA has been very involved in U.S.-Mexican environ-
mental issues. EPA has, together with Mexican environmental agencies, re-
viewed thousands of environmental law violations, many of which have been
rectified.
IV International, Not Just Transnational
It is important to think ofthe precedential role that domestic U.S. legisla-
tion and regulation can have internationally. For example, much of the emis-
sion permit trading scheme that has been woven into the Kyoto Protocol and
the subsequent Bonn and Marrakesh agreements (of which, disappointingly,
the U.S. is the only developed nation holdout) derives from the permit trading
mechanisms initially established under the U.S. Clean Air Act.20 Similarly,
technology and water quality-based methods of enforcement developed in the
U.S. under the CWA could serve as precedents for future water policy deci-
sions by developing nations.
In the case of water pollution, there is a desperate need for international
regulatory implementation and reform with regard to both the oceans and
freshwater resources. The oceans are the ultimate recipients of NPS pollution,
such as run-off, and yet this issue is weakly addressed by the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea." Observers repeatedly have characterized
freshwater pollution as the most pervasive environmental problem on the
planet. Nearly one-third of the world's population lacks access to proper
sanitation facilities, and over one billion individuals lack access to clean
water. NPS pollutants, like human and livestock waste, are the major culprits.
As developing nations continue to pursue paths of economic development -
paths that they value quite highly - the regulatory imperative becomes even
more important as pollution outputs can be expected to increase. This means
that developed nations with advanced regulatory mechanisms and the technol-
ogy to implement those mechanisms are under an ethical (and also a self-inter-
ested) obligation to share that knowledge with developing nations.
20. See Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, art. 6, 37 I.L.M. 22, 35 (envisioning a trading
system), available at http'/www.unfccc.deresource/docs/cop3/107a01.htm (last visited Feb. 27,
2002).
21. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 126.
Article 207 of this convention provides that states shall adopt laws and regulations to control
pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources.
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Although international law regulates the nearly 300 rivers that are shared
by more than one country, it is not overwhelmingly robust in the area of regu-
lating NPS pollution that enters one country from another. There is one impor-
tant convention that addresses this issue: the 1997 International Watercourse
Convention.22 Article 21 of the Convention mandates that signatory states
control activities that may constitute detrimental alterations in the composition
or quality of the waters of an international watercourse. While this provision
is an important step in improving water quality, the Convention is far from
having the 35 national ratifications required for it to come into force. Perhaps
the transborder regulatory models that are operating at the regional level in
North America, such as the IJC and the NAAEC, could constitute precedential
documents for more robust multilateral environmental governance.
V The Constitution as an Environmental Suicide Pact?
There are a number of constitutional and statutory imperatives that
restrict the ability of the federal government or federal administrative agencies
to regulate environmental matters. These trigger difficult questions regarding
the ability of the Constitution to cope with transnational environmental prob-
lems. Although McCulley may be optimistic about the ability of environmen-
tal federalism to operate effectively at the state level, I am somewhat more
circumspect. I worry about a regulatory checkerboard that looks all the more
inadequate when it is clear that an important focal point for future regulation
is at the continental or international level.
Although I am certainly not an expert on U.S. constitutional law, I feel
comfortable asserting that Congressional authority over interstate navigation
and water pollution generally is based on the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, which gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with for-
eign nations and among the several states. In a series of early cases, the Su-
preme Court established that federal constitutional authority over commerce
includes navigation.' Interstate commerce jurisdiction could be had over nav-
igable waters insofar as these waters create a highway over which commerce
with other states or foreign countries can be established. In an 1874 decision,
The Montello, the scope of "navigable waters" was extended to include not
just waters in actual commercial use, but also waters that vessels could poten-
tially use commercially.24 Much later, this type of reasoning helped legitimize
22. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
May 21, 1997,36 I.L.M. 700.
23. See, e.g., Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409, 424 (1917); United
States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U.S. 211, 215-16 (1900), Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1866), Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 518, 577-78 (1851).
24. The Montello, 87 U.S. 430,43940 (1874).
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the CWA. Interestingly, the background to the CWA does not have too much
to do with the environment per se. Rather, it reflects a policy desire to keep
rivers and navigable waters free of obstruction for actual or potential naviga-
tion. Over time, though, environmental concerns grew in importance. What
was once a need to ensure commerce turned into a need to protect against
pollution. This change in focus has important implications when the federal
government endeavors constitutionally to justify legislation over fresh water
resources.
Beginning in the 1990s, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the
interstate commerce clause. In the 1995 case United States v. Lopez, the
Court held that a law would only be upheld when the activity that it regulates
is economic in nature and substantially affects interstate commerce.' Hence,
a federal law that established gun-free zones around schools and provided
criminal penalties for violations thereof was not justifiable under the interstate
commerce clause. In the 2000 case United States v. Morrison, the Court held
that federal legislation of a purely intrastate activity will only be upheld if the
activity is economic in nature.26 The Morrison Court stated that there must
be a sufficiently direct link between the activity legislated and the effect on
interstate commerce because otherwise almost any purely intrastate activity
could be regulated as interstate commerce.27 As a result, in that decision the
Court struck down the section of the Violence Against Women Act that pro-
vided a federal civil remedy to victims of gender-motivated violence.
The CWA has also been a lightening-rod for such constitutional claims.
Parties have raised these claims in two recent cases: Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC)' and Pron-
solino v. Marcus." However, in neither case were these claims successful.
Instead, courts decided both cases upon principles of statutory interpretation.
For example, in SWANCC, the Supreme Court faced the question of the legit-
imacy of the Migratory Bird Rule, a provision promulgated by the Army
Corps of Engineers to clarify its jurisdiction over "navigable waters" under
§ 404(a) of the CWA.30 The Court held that the legitimacy of the regulation
25. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
26. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,611 (2000).
27. Id. at 615.
28. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159 (2001).
29. Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337,1356 (N.D. Cal. 2000), appeal docketed,
No. 00-16026 (9th Cir. May 24, 2000); Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 22-23,
Pronsolino v. Marcus, (9th Cir. filed Jan. 11, 2001) (No. 00-16026, No. 00-16027) (quoting
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
172 (2001)).
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000).
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was not a question of constitutional law. 1 Instead, using general principles
of statutory construction, the Court found that Congress simply did not intend
for the jurisdiction of the CWA to extend to isolated bodies of water such as
the intrastate wetlands covered by the Migratory Bird Rule. 2 Accordingly,
the rule was found to be an unauthorized extension of the Army Corps of
Engineers' power under the CWA. Although this decision may foreshadow
a shift in the balance of regulatory power between the federal and state gov-
ernments in environmental matters, the fact that the Court based the decision
on statutory interpretation, as opposed to constitutional interpretation, makes
any such shift much more permeable.
Although states may themselves elect to fill these legislative gaps, I am
concerned that not all states may be properly equipped to implement and
oversee sophisticated environmental regulations. First, most states cannot
afford such regulations. Second, not all states may have the incentive to vig-
orously implement strict TMDLs, given the free-rider effects of a neighboring
or upstream state's or nation's decision not to implement similar regulations.
Can state bureaucracies network with foreign national and sub-national actors
through transnational regulatory associations? If so, how effectively? Can
states negotiate agreements with neighboring nations and sub-national entities
within those nations? To be sure, some of these kinds of agreements are
found on the books and, in fact, reflect a sophisticated understanding of and
commitment to environmental policy. However, I am concerned that these
agreements may be the exception rather than the rule.
VI. Conclusion
Environmental policy cannot just be a matter for local government.
Accordingly, environmental governance increasingly is operating at the
regional, continental, multinational, and even global level. The transnational
nature of environmental harms is prompting environmental supra-nationalism.
If supra-national regulatory entities are well-suited to address many unregu-
lated aspects of environmental harm, their expansion ought to be fostered. A
constitutional order that curtails federal environmental management in prefer-
ence of local autonomy may not be conducive to the need for environmental
supra-nationalism.
31. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173.
32. Id. at 172.
